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MULTIPLE NETWORKS AND MOBILIZATION IN THE PARIS COMMUNE
A decade ago, Snow, Zurcher, and EklandOlson (1980) pointed to the importance of social networks for understanding the mobilization of social movements, but the state of research in this area is still best described as inchoate. Despite widespread acceptance of the idea that "network" or "structural" factors play a role in mobilization or recruitment, only a handful of studies have made genuine progress toward understanding the significance of these factors.
A principal reason for this state of affairs is that -often because of data considerations researchers have typically used purely scalar variables to measure networks of social relations. "Network effects" are examined by simply counting social ties and using these counts as interval variables in regression equations, so that the process by which social ties influence mobilization is analyzed as though it operates exclusively on the individual level. This in turn means that two key issues -network structure and multiplexity -have received insufficient consideration in theory and research.
My goal is to demonstrate that the effect of social relations on the mobilization of collective action depends on the way in which these relations are structured and, more precisely, on the correspondence between organizational and informal networks. I use data on patterns of insurgency during the Paris Commune of 1871 to show that successful mobilization depended not on the sheer number of ties, but on the interplay between social ties created by insurgent organizations and pre-existing social networks rooted in Parisian neighborhoods. Organizational networks maintained solidarity because they were structured along neighborhood lines. Paradoxically, neighborhood ties even determined the importance of organizational links that cut across neigh-
borhoods.
Previous studies have rarely demonstrated that structural properties of relational systems are important for social movements, and there is no discussion in the literature of the ways in which formal and informal networks interact in the mobilization process. In the conclusion, I argue that these issues are best addressed through data collection procedures and analytic strategies that respect the structure of networks rather than reducing networks to individual-level counts of social ties.
NETWORK FACTORS IN MOBILIZATION
The notion of social structure, in various guises, has played a role in theories of collective action for a long time (Smelser 1963; Oberschall 1973 ). However, it was only with the publication of Snow, Zurcher, and Ekland-Olson's (1980) seminal article that a specifically network-based conceptualization of structure gained currency in social movement research. Reacting to the undersocialized view of human behavior characteristic of early versions of the resource mobilization perspective (McCarthy and Zald 1973, 1977; Gamson 1975 ), Snow and his colleagues demonstrated that social ties to members of Nichiren Shoshu of America were instrumental in drawing new members into the organization. This was a significant finding because it focused attention on the "microstructural" bases of social movement recruitment.
Subsequent research has yielded similar results, most notably in McAdam's (1986 McAdam's ( , 1988 study of recruitment to the 1964 Mississippi Freedom Summer project. But in each case, supposedly "structural" factors in recruitment are measured as individual-level variables: Ties between participants and movement activists that predate recruitment are counted and the resulting number used as an independent variable in a regression equation. In some cases, organizational affiliations or respondents' subjective evaluations about how integrated they are have been substituted for network data (see, e.g., Cable, Walsh, and Warland 1988).
While the difficulty of collecting and analyzing true network data make this a practical approach, it masks the complexity inherent in social networks and does not permit inquiry into the possibility that network influences on mobilization operate on a supra-individual level. The effect on A of a social tie to B may depend on whether A is also tied to C, but this kind of interlock disappears when networks are reduced to numerical counts of ties.
Recently, researchers have begun to address this issue by exploring the effects of specifically structural aspects of social networks. In a later study of the Freedom Summer project, Fernandez and McAdam (1988) analyzed the effect on participation of an individual's network prominence -a measure of centrality that uses the first eigenvector of the network matrix to weight each person's ties by the centrality of the people to whom he or she is tied. This specification of network effects permits an individual's position in a social structure to play a role in movement recruitment. A simulation study by Marwell, Oliver, and Prahl (1988) explored the effect of group-level variables -network centralization and resource heterogeneity -on aggregate contributions to a collective good.
While these research efforts represent an important advance inasmuch as they refuse to treat social ties in piecemeal fashion and place an emphasis on networks as such, they focus on single networks and thus neglect the second key issue, network multiplexity.' Yet one of the key reasons network structure is significant is that mobilization typically creates organizational networks that overlay and interact with pre-existing informal networks. Thus, a focus on network structure entails a simultaneous examination of formal and informal networks.
There are three principal reasons why the Paris Commune of 1871 is an especially useful setting for an investigation into the problem of social networks and social movements. First, insurgent mobilization was effected through a highly visible formal organization, the Paris National Guard, so that it is possible to make precise statements about how participants were recruited to the uprising. Second, National Guard units were generally organized along neighborhood lines, with the important exception of 35 volunteer battalions. This means that mobilization outcomes across units can be compared with respect to a critical variable: the availability of neighborhood social ties as a source of solidarity. Finally, the connection between the organizational structure of the insurgent effort and the social structure of neighborhoods permits an examination of the extent to which social networks and organizational networks interact in affecting social movement mobilization.
THE COMMUNAL REVOLUTION OF 1871
The late 1 860s were a period of social and political ferment in Paris as well as the rest of urban France.2 In part because of an 1864 law legaliz-' In Marwell, Oliver, and Prahl's (1988) simulation study, only one kind of relation is assumed to exist: Individuals are either tied to each other or not, and there is no provision for multiple social ties. Similarly, Fernandez and McAdam (1988) restricted their attention to the network of social ties generated by joint membership in activist organizations, thus neglecting the effects of any social ties not specifically connected with the mobilization of activism.ing strikes and an 1868 law liberalizing controls on the press and public meetings, but also because of growing discontent with the regime of Emperor Louis Napoleon, strikes became more frequent throughout France's industrial regions and calls for social and political reforms became more vociferous. Although France's economy had grown and industrialized since the declaration of the Second Empire in Bonaparte's "Eighteenth Brumaire" of 1851, the growing prosperity had chiefly benefitted propertied classes and finance capitalists at the expense of the working population, which included proletarianized industrial workers as well as artisans (Edwards 1971) .
Unlike the revolutions of 1789 and 1848, the events of 1871 were not preceded by a nationwide agricultural crisis. The combination of an economic recession and a misguided war with Prussia over the succession of a Hohenzollern prince to the Spanish throne were sufficient to sweep away the Empire without a shot being fired. A series of embarrassing defeats of France's armies, including the encirclement of one force at Metz and the capture of a second -along with the Emperor himself-at Sedan, led to the proclamation of a Republic in Paris on September4, 1870.
The defeats continued, however, and Paris was subjected to a four-month winter siege by the Prussian army. In January 1871, the rural population of France elected a National Assembly determined to sign a peace treaty with Bismarck, the Prussian Chancellor. The radical deputies from Paris, who wanted to continue the war rather than surrender, were outvoted, and the capital was ceded to the Prussian army (although the victorious forces were permitted only to march through, not occupy, the city). A struggle ensued between the conservative government of Adolphe Thiers and the people of Paris over the disposition of the artillery of the Paris National Guard, the popular militia force of 300,000 men that had been armed during the Prussian siege. nance of social order through a strong monarchy. But in 1879, after nearly a decade of right-wing reaction under the presidency of Marshal MacMahon, the monarchist general who had engineered the crushing of the Commune, Republicans finally gained a majority in both houses of the legislature. Less than a year later, a general amnesty was approved for all those still imprisoned for participating in the 1871 uprising. In the ensuing months, thousands of convicted insurgents returned to France -leaving behind hundreds who had died serving their sentences.
SOCIAL NETWORKS AND SOCIAL MOVEMENT MOBILIZATION
Mobilization does not just depend on social ties; it also creates them. Although members of a protest organization may have joined because of a pre-existing social tie to an activist, they also form new social relations while participating in collective protest (for a discussion of some of the long-term effects of such ties, see McAdam 1988). Without addressing the matter directly, the current view of how social networks influence mobilization implies that pre-existing ties do not matter once someone has been recruited. For example, Marwell, Oliver, and Prahl's (1988) simulation treated an actor's contribution to a collective good as unproblematic once he or she had been contacted by a movement organizer. Fernandez and McAdam (1988) argued that their focus on the organizational affiliations of applicants to the Freedom Summer project was "ideally suited for studying the network or other factors that maintain commitment to the project among the set of applicants" (p. 360). These approaches implicitly presuppose that the ties established during the process of mobilization tell us everything we need to know about continued participation; pre-existing ties may have helped create these new ties by facilitating initial recruitment, but they have no further influence.
Evidence from the final week of the Paris Commune strongly suggests that this view is incorrect. The residential recruitment system of the National Guard, which assigned people to battalions on the basis of the neighborhood in which they lived, provided more than an organizational framework for the insurgent effort.3 Rather, the policy of recruitment along residential lines was crucial for mobilization until the last moments of fighting because it linked the informal social networks defined by neighborhoods to the formal network generated among insurgents by joint membership in the National Guard. Members of each battalion were tied to each other not only through their shared organizational affiliation, but also by the fact that they were neighbors.
The importance of neighborhood solidarity in maintaining the cohesiveness of residentially organized units was clearly evident in the persistence with which rank-and-file National Guardsmen associated their participation in the insurgent effort with a neighborhood-based identity. One group of Guardsmen in the second battalion, which was recruited primarily in the eighth Paris arrondissement, protested their inclusion in a Guard unit from another neighborhood: For battalions recruited along neighborhood lines, 42.7 percent of the total arrests for the week were made in the last two days, compared with 31.9 percent for Guardsmen in volunteer battalions. In general, insurgents in neighborhoodbased units were arrested at considerably later stages in the fighting, indicating that these battalions were more cohesive than those that were not organized residentially.
It is apparent from these data that informal social networks are implicated in social movement mobilization well past the initial stages of recruitment. Pre-existing social ties helped to maintain solidarity in the 1871 insurrection even after par-ticipants were firmly embedded in organizational networks because National Guard battalions tied people together in ways that mirrored the division of the Parisian social world into well-defined neighborhoods. Thus, neighborhood social structure contributed not only to the formation of insurgent organizations, but also to their effectiveness as tools for mounting collective protest.
Solidarity and Structure
These findings could be interpreted as showing only that social ties need to be counted more accurately, i.e., network multiplexity might only imply that different kinds of ties contribute additively to mobilization and the maintenance of solidarity. If this were true, sociologists would still not need to consider structure: they would simply need to remember that pairs of people can be tied in more than one way and that multiple ties (friendship, shared organizational membership, and so on) can exert simultaneous but independent effects on mobilization.
But this is not the whole story. Neighborhood ties and organizational ties created by the National Guard actedjointly to maintain solidarity in the ranks of Parisian insurgents; and it is because of this interaction between the two networks that their structure must be taken into account.
Despite the general policy of residential recruitment, a substantial number of Guardsmen were enlisted in battalions outside their own neighborhoods. Thus, they were linked by the insurgent organization to people who were not tied to them as neighbors; conversely, they were linked as neighbors to other insurgents with whom they did not have organizational ties. In other words, these insurgents constituted organizational links across neighborhoods and neighborhood links across organizations.
The analysis presented below shows that the network of social ties created by overlapping enlistments had important consequences for the insurgent effort. These overlaps made levels of commitment to the insurrection interdependent across residential areas: the degree to which each neighborhood was successful in mounting resistance to the Versailles army depended on levels of resistance in the other neighborhoods to which it was linked.
DATA AND METHODS
The most effective test of the claim that resistance levels are interdependent is a regression model The second dependent variable is the number of deaths per 1,000 inhabitants for each arrondissement during the month of May. Ideally, deaths from natural causes should be subtracted from arrondissement totals, but this information is unavailable. Given the large increase in the number of deaths during the insurrection, however, it is likely that most of the variation in this variable is attributable to differential rates of participation in the fighting rather than to variation in the death rates from other causes. There is one other source of measurement error: the dozens of wounded insurgents who died in military hospitals during the semaine sanglante tend to inflate the totals for arrondissements containing large hospitals.5 Consequently, the analyses of death rates include a term for the number of deaths from military injuries that occurred in each district in February 1871. Since fighting with the Prussians ceased in January, any military deaths in February presumably occurred in hospitals; this variable should therefore correct for distortions in the death rates for May 1871 that result from the presence of large hospitals. Data for these measures come from the city's monthly bulletin of vital statistics (Ville de Paris 1872). Although row-normalization is a technical necessity, it also has substantive implications. Forcing all the rows of W to sum to 1.0 means that the effect on A of a network tie to B can only be modeled relative to the total number of ties A has to other nodes. Thus, the model is insensitive to variation in degree (number of ties) across nodes in the network: A node with 1,000 ties is assumed to be subject to the same amount of network influence as a node with 2,000 ties. This situation could be rectified if the model permitted the value of p to vary across nodes, but techniques to estimate such a model have not been developed. Poverty is hypothesized to have contributed positively to resistance levels for two reasons. First, the poor people of Paris had suffered the greatest hardship during the four-month Prussian siege and were therefore most likely to be hostile toward the French government for having surrendered. Second, National Guardsmen were paid a small daily indemnity (1 franc 50 centimes) under the Commune. This incentive to If the absolute number of ties were the key determinant of the magnitude of network influence, it would be undesirable to make this assumption. In the present case, however, this limitation of the model does not pose a problem. Indeed, row-normalization provides a necessary control for variation in population size across arrondissements. For each arrondissement, the total number of Guardsmen enlisted in outside legions is roughly proportional to the size of the adult male population (r = .78). Row-normalization permits the model to reflect the theoretical supposition that 1,000 cross-enlisted insurgents from a district with 40,000 men would have about the same effect as 2,000 insurgents from a district with 80,000 men. 
RESULTS
The first four columns of Table 1 present estimates for the models predicting battalion size in both early May and late May; columns 5 and 6 report results for the models predicting death rates during the month of May. To test whether autocorrelation is a result of cross-district enlistments rather than simple geographical diffusion, two versions of the model are estimated. The "spatial model" substitutes a spatial adjacency matrix for the enlistment network used in the "network model." The hypothesis is that autocorrelation through the enlistment network is larger (more positive) than autocorrelation through spatial contiguity. In the spatial model, wij is coded as 1 if district i borders on district j, and 0 otherwise; the W matrix is then row-normalized as with the network model. Because sampling logic is inappropriate for these data, standard significance tests are not used. The significance levels reported are based on a null model of "randomization" of the observed values of y with respect to the W and X matrices (Odland 1988 ). The estimates of p and B are compared with the distribution of the estimates that would result from a random assignment of the observed values of y to the 20 cases.7 Coefficient estimates are statistically significant at the .05 level if fewer than 5 percent of random assignments produce estimates of equal or greater value.
As predicted, all of the exogenous variables contribute positively to battalion size and death rates in all models, although the only statistically significant effect is that for percentage salaried workers. Since the reference category for the occupational composition variables is bourgeois/professional, the coefficients confirm the hypothesis that resistance was stronger in areas that were poor and working-class. The expectation that whitecollar and unskilled workers would play less prominent roles in the insurrection is not supported.
The most important finding is that the autocorrelation term, p, is positive and significant in the network models for battalion size in early May and late May. A significant autocorrelation effect is observed only when W represents crossdistrict enlistments; there is no evidence of autocorrelation through spatial adjacency in either early or late May. In addition, the estimate of p in the network model for late May is significantly larger (p < .05) than the estimate in the spatial model.8 Similar results obtain for the number of deaths per 1,000 inhabitants (columns 5 and 6). The network of militia enrollments made levels 7 Doreian (1981) provides formulae for computing standard errors based on the assumption of sampling observations from a normally distributed population. Because the 20 arrondissements analyzed here constitute the population in question, the randomization model is more appropriate. The distributions of p and B are generated through simulation in which the model is repeatedly estimated with randomly generated permutations of the values of y with respect to the 20 arrondissements.
I Tests for differences in p between the two equations are performed in a manner analogous to those for the point estimates within each equation. Estimates are iteratively calculated for random assignments of the values of y to the observations, and for each iteration the estimate of p is computed once for each specification of the W matrix. This procedure generates a distribution of differences between estimates of p for a given set of data and two networks. of insurgency significantly interdependent across districts, whereas spatial proximity did not.9 The fit of the models predicting late May battalion size and death rates improves when the enlistment network rather than spatial adjacency is used. These findings show that insurgents in different neighborhoods influenced each other's degree of commitment to the insurrection through the network of links created by overlapping enlistments. High levels of commitment in one area enhanced commitment elsewhere when enlistment patterns provided a conduit for communication and interaction. This effect cannot be explained in terms of purely spatial diffusion, dem-9 This result could reflect a causal relationship in which battalion size influenced the pattern of enlistment overlaps rather than the reverse. For instance, if neighborhoods with extremely high enlistment rates sent their overflows to other neighborhoods, but not to neighborhoods with very low rates, a positive auto--correlation effect would be observed. Three considerations militate against this interpretation, however. First, it seems unlikely that cross-district enlistments were the result of oversubscription in some areas because battalion sizes nowhere reached the target level of 1,500 men: The largest average battalion size was 1,155 for the fifteenth arrondissement (1,287 in early May). Second, enlistment rolls were closed at the end of April, so if autocorrelation were the result of the restructuring of battalions in response-to disparities in onstrating that resistance levels were rendered interdependent across districts through a fundamentally social network.
Even more intriguing is the fact that this influence process worked in one direction only: Neighborhoods responded to events in other areas where their residents served in National Guard units. For instance, resistance in the fifth arrondissement was positively affected by the fact that many of its residents served in the thirteenth legion, whose members demonstrated a strong commitment to the insurgent effort. However, this does not imply that resistance in the thirteenth arrondissement was affected by the presence of Guardsmen from the fifth.'0 Indeed, Table 2 shows that this was not the case by estimating the network models using the transpose of the enlistment matrix W (written W'). Here, each element (w'i) represents the number of Guards serving in the ith legion who live in the jth district, divided by the total number of Guards in the ith legion who live outside the ith district. Under this model, each district is influenced by other districts through the Guardsmen who lived in these other areas, not by its own residents serving as Guardsmen in other areas." i Using W' instead of W, the coefficient estimate for autocorrelation through the enlistment network is not significant for any of the dependent variables. Furthermore, the model for battalion size in early May yields an estimate of p that is significantly lower (p < .05) than the estimate using W. The fit for the equation predicting battalion size in late May drops from .703 in the model using W to .673 in the model using W'; the fit for the model predicting death rates drops from .471 to .441. This analysis indicates that levels of resistance in each arrondissement were affected by the experiences of its own residents serving in the National Guard in other districts, but not by the enlistment rates, a stronger effect would have been observed in early May rather than in late May. Finally, the fact that the analysis of death rates produces the same result suggests that the autocorrelation in Table 1 is not an artifact of the way resistance levels are measured.
10 Table 1 does indicate, however, that commitment to the insurrection in the thirteenth ai-rondissement was influenced by the enlistment of some of its residents in the fifth legion.
" The spatial adjacency matrix is by definition symmetric, so that for spatial data, W = W'. Consequently, it would be redundant to re-estimate the spatial models for Table 2. experiences of Guardsmen who lived in other districts. On an individual level, then, the influence process occurred because insurgents serving away from home had an impact on the behavior of their neighbors serving at home; but these insurgents did not affect the behavior of the Guardsmen with whom they served.
This finding provides strong evidence that formal and informal networks do not affect mobilization independently. The organizational links the National Guard generated through overlapping enlistments established a kind of crossneighborhood solidarity in the form of interdependent levels of resistance, but this interdependence only emerged because the insurgents whose battalion memberships constituted these organizational ties also had informal ties to people in their own neighborhoods. Thus, the influence of formal and informal networks on mobilization cannot be described in additive terms; rather, neighborhood and organizational ties interacted to forge and maintain solidarity among insurgents.
DISCUSSION
The reductionist treatment of network factors in social movement research has obscured important aspects of their effects on mobilization. Sociologists have typically treated network data as they would any other variable: Information on social ties among movement participants has been collected and analyzed at the individual level. A few scholars (Fernandez and McAdam 1988; Marwell, Oliver, and Prahl 1988) have pointed to the advantages of an approach that is more sensitive to structural properties of networks, but the issue of network multiplexity has not been studied until now.
This study demonstrates not only that multiplexity and structure are both central to an understanding of network effects on mobilization, but that the impact of structure cannot even be appreciated without taking multiplexity into account. The importance of neighborhood identity and the pattern of arrests showed that pre-existing social ties among neighbors and organizational ties formed by the National Guard worked together to maintain solidarity in the insurgent ranks. Formal ties alone cannot explain the localistic behavior of residentially recruited battalions or the fact that they were more cohesive during the final week of fighting than volunteer battalions. Thus, it is inappropriate to focus exclusively on networks created by formal movement organizations, even when discussing the latest phases of mobilization.12 But it is precisely because mobilization is simultaneously affected by more than one network that network structure cannot be ignored.'3 The cross-district influence process uncovered in the Paris Commune resulted from the interaction of informal neighborhood networks with the organizational network of the Paris National Guard. Cross-neighborhood solidarity could not have emerged in the absence of enlistment overlaps that linked each residential area with Guard units in other areas; but these overlaps only made resistance levels interdependent across areas because mobilization was rooted in social ties among neighbors.
The interaction of multiple networks demonstrates the importance of structure in two ways. First, the notion of a network of overlapping enlistments presupposes that informal ties grouped people into neighborhoods and organizational ties grouped people into residentially based National Guard units. That is, it is not even possible to discuss enlistment overlaps without first recognizing that residential areas linked people informally as neighbors, and that National Guard battalions linked people formally as members of an insurgent organization. To recognize that formal and informal ties clustered people into neighborhoods and organizational units is to recognize that these ties exhibit a structure. Second, the process by which neighborhoods influenced each other through these overlapping enlistments can only be analyzed by considering the entire network of overlaps. Each neighborhood simultaneously affected and was affected by the levels of resistance in other neighborhoods, both directly (to the extent that it was directly 12 Fernandez and McAdam (1988) noted that their data permit a discussion only of the later stages of mobilization, and acknowledge that other (unobserved) networks may have played significant roles earlier in the recruitment process. But they do not consider the possibility that informal relationships may continue to affect recruitment late in the mobilization process. Effects of prior networks are thus implicitly assumed to be mediated by, rather than interacting with, the network of organizational affiliations.
'3There is nothing particularly original in the claim that structure is closely related to network multiplexity. White, Boorman and Breiger (1976) made multiple networks a pivotal component of the blockmodelling approach to social structure. Still, this issue has not come up in social movement research despite increasing interest in network factors. linked to each of these neighborhoods) and indirectly (to the extent that each of these other neighborhoods was itself influenced by still other neighborhoods, and so on). In other words, the influence process occurred not just between isolated pairs of neighborhoods, but through chains of neighborhoods linked directly and at various removes. The interdependence of resistance levels across residential areas was thus intimately tied not only to the quantity, but also to the structure of overlapping enlistments. This intricate pattern would be obscured in an analysis that disaggregated networks into scalar counts of ties.
I have concentrated on the interplay between two specific social networks: one consisting of neighborhood ties, and the other defined by membership in a military organization. This focus derives from the nature of the event because mobilization in the 1871 uprising revolved around the construction and defense of barricades -a distinctly neighborhood-oriented revolutionary tactic -by a militia recruited along residential lines.
But this study's findings have implications for social movement research that go beyond the roles of neighborhoods and militias. Mobilization itself creates new social ties, even as it relies on pre-existing ties as a source of solidarity. In general, then, it should be possible to characterize any mobilization in terms of a mapping of formal organizational ties onto an indigenous network of informal ties -a mapping that can be quantified using techniques for comparing adjacency matrices. Where social movement organizations are isomorphic to pre-existing social structure (e.g., if National Guard enlistments had mirrored neighborhood boundaries perfectly, with no cross-district enrollments), formal networks should have minimal effects on solidarity. In such a situation, formal organization might make social protest more effective by rationalizing participation, but not by inducing greater commitment. On the other hand, formal organizations that mobilize people in ways that completely cut across pre-existing networks, as in the volunteer Guard units, should experience considerable difficulty in sustaining commitment unless they manage to supplant such networks -by creating total institutions (see, e.g., Walzer's [1980] The intermediate case, in which mobilization groups people in ways that largely follow the contours of indigenous social structure but also generates some interaction across pre-existing boundaries, provides the greatest potential for formal and informal networks to jointly influence solidarity and commitment to social movements. Most instances of social movement mobilization, like the present one, fall into this middle category. Consequently, future research should focus on informal and organizational ties concurrently rather than individually. This shift in focus will make discussion of the structure rather than the number of network ties indispensable. ROGER V. GOULD is Assistant Professor in the Department of Sociology at the University of Chicago. His research interests include social movements, social networks, and historical sociology. He is currently working on a book about class consciousness and labor protest in nineteenth-century Paris. 4 On the other side of the barricades, history has repeatedly shown how difficult it is for elites to make effective use of military organizations whose members interact regularly with the population they are supposed to control. This is the central theme of Traugott's (1985) study of the Parisian insurrection of 1848, and is echoed in most work on the February Revolution in Russia (Chorley 1943; Fitzpatrick 1982) . Indeed, fraternization between the French army and the people of Paris was a key factor in the government's embarrassing defeat on March 18, 1871.
